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Abstract: For most firms, especially the small- and medium-sized ones, the operational decisions are affected by their internal
capital and ability to obtain external capital. However, the majority of the literature on dynamic inventory control ignores the firm’s
financial status and financing issues. An important question that arises is: what are the optimal inventory and financing policies
for firms with limited internal capital and limited access to external capital? In this article, we study a dynamic inventory control
problem where a capital-constrained firm periodically purchases a product from a supplier and sells it to a market with random
demands. In each period, the firm can use its own capital and/or borrow a short-term loan to purchase the product, with the interest
rate being nondecreasing in the loan size. The objective is to maximize the firm’s expected terminal wealth at the end of the planning
horizon. We show that the optimal inventory policy in each period is an equity-level-dependent base-stock policy, where the equity
level is the sum of the firm’s capital level and the value of its on-hand inventory evaluated at the purchasing cost; and the structure
of the optimal policy can be characterized by four intervals of the equity level. Our results shed light on the dynamic inventory
control for firms with limited capital and short-term financing capabilities. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61:
184–201, 2014
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1. INTRODUCTION
The majority of the literature on dynamic inventory con-
trol ignores the financial status of a firm and assumes that
it always has enough capital to implement any operational
decisions (see, e.g., Zipkin [23]). Such ignorance may be
justified by the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller [15],
which implies that a firm’s operational and financial deci-
sions can be made separately in a perfect capital market. In
practice, however, most firms (especially the start-up, small-,
and medium-sized ones) do not operate in perfect capital
markets, and their operational decisions are affected by their
internal capital and ability to obtain external capital such as
bank loans, equity, and venture capital investment. Indeed,
according to a report from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, for firms with limited access to capital markets, inter-
nal fund is a significant predicator of inventory investment
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(Zakrajšek [22]). Thus, an important question that arises is:
what are the optimal inventory and financing policies for the
firms with limited internal capital and limited access to exter-
nal capital? For instance, it is well-known that a base-stock
policy is optimal for the classic periodic-review inventory
system, so how does the optimal inventory policy change if
the firm has limited capital and can only obtain short-term
loans?
In this article, we address this question by studying
a dynamic inventory control problem where a capital-
constrained firm periodically purchases a product from a
supplier and sells it to a market with random demands. In
each period, the firm can use its own capital and/or borrow a
short-term loan from a lender to purchase the product, with
the total loan interest being an increasing and convex func-
tion of the loan size. The firm can also deposit its extra capital
into a savings account with a fixed interest rate. The random
demand is realized during the period, and the sales revenue is
then collected. At the end of the period, the firm’s capital is
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updated after receiving its deposited capital and interest from
the savings account and paying the principal and interest of
the short-term loan. Meanwhile, unsold product is carried to
the next period and it is salvaged at the end of the planning
horizon; and any unmet demand is lost. The firm’s objective
is to maximize its expected terminal wealth (capital) at the
end of the planning horizon.
We formulate the firm’s problem as a stochastic dynamic
program with two state variables: the firm’s inventory level
and capital level at the beginning of each period. By studying
the structural properties of the dynamic program, we show
that an equity-level-dependent base-stock inventory policy is
optimal in each period, where the equity level is the sum of
the firm’s capital level and the value of its on-hand inventory
evaluated at the purchasing cost. This result is consistent with
the finding in Zakrajšek [22] that “the observed volatility in
aggregate retail inventory . . . is due to fluctuations in internal
funds". We further study the structure of the firm’s optimal
base-stock policy, and show that it can be characterized by
dividing the equity level into four different intervals. In one of
these intervals, the firm does not order regardless of its inven-
tory; and in the second one, the firm has a constant optimal
base-stock level and only uses its own capital for replenish-
ment. In the third interval, the optimal base-stock level equals
the amount of products the equity can purchase, and in this
case, the firm simply uses up its capital for replenishment
and does not borrow from the lender. In the fourth and last
interval, the optimal base-stock level is a capital-dependent
curve and may not be even monotone in the equity level. In
this interval, some partial structural results are obtained. We
also extend the base model to the case with physical hold-
ing cost, the case with reorganization bankruptcy, and the
case with fixed borrowing cost. We show that most of our
results continue to hold under the first two extensions; while
for the third extension, the problem is much more compli-
cated and we characterize the optimal policy only for the
last-period problem. Our results shed light on the optimal
dynamic inventory control for firms with limited capital and
short-term financing.
This work is mainly related to the literature on inventory
systems with financial considerations. Most of the existing
studies are based on single-period models, in which deci-
sion makers have only one chance to make operational and
financial decisions under financial constraints. Some of these
models focus on a single firm’s optimal decisions. For exam-
ple, Xu and Birge [18,20] study joint production and financ-
ing decisions of a capital-constrained firm in the presence of
demand uncertainty, market imperfections, and managerial
incentives; and Babich et al. [2] study the joint procurement
and financing decisions of a capital-constrained firm, facing
either an uncertain demand or an uncertain supply. There are
a number of research papers on single-period models study-
ing the effects of financial constraints and financing sources
with strategic interactions in supply chains. For example,
Buzacott and Zhang [4] incorporate asset-based financing
into production decisions and analyze a Stackelberg game
between a bank and a retailer; and Dada and Hu [6] study a
capital-constrained newsverdor’s optimal borrowing amount
when a bank determines the interest rate to maximize its own
profits. Recently, Kouvelis and Zhao [13] study a Stackel-
berg game between a supplier and a retailer when the retailer
faces bankruptcy risk if it borrows from a bank; and Yang and
Birge [21] analyze the effects of trade credit in supply chains
with costs of financial distress. The main difference between
these models and ours is that we study a dynamic inventory
control model where a single firm makes multiple operational
and financial decisions during the planning horizon.
In contrast to many studies on single-period models, only a
few studies have considered dynamic inventory models with
financial considerations. Two of these studies focus on the
self-financing firms which solely rely on their internal capi-
tal (and sales revenue) to operate. Archibald et al. [1] study
the optimal ordering policy of a start-up firm with the objec-
tive to maximize its probability of long-term survival. Chao
et al. [5] study the optimal inventory policy of a self-financing
firm to maximize its expected terminal wealth and show that
the optimal policy is a modified base-stock policy (i.e., there
exists a base-stock level in each period, and the optimal pol-
icy aims to raise the inventory to this level subject to the
firm’s capital). The other studies incorporate one or more
external financing sources (e.g., bank loans, debt, and capital
subscription) into the dynamic models. Babich and Sobel [3]
incorporate short-term loans with a fixed interest rate and
study a firm’s optimal operational and financial decisions to
maximize its expected discounted proceeds from an initial
public offering. Xu and Birge [19] propose a finite-horizon
integrated planning model for a firm, which can both borrow
short-term loans and issue equity, to maximize the expected
discounted value of net cash flow to the firm’s shareholders.
Their model is an integer stochastic program with nonlinear
constraints; and the authors develop an efficient algorithm
to solve it numerically. With a similar objective to Xu and
Birge [19] and under the assumption that the firm continues
to operate but pays a default penalty when it goes bankrupt,
Hu and Sobel [10] study a multi-echelon inventory model
and show that echelon base-stock policies are in general not
optimal with financial constraints; and Li et al. [14] study the
optimal inventory and financial policies for a single-echelon
model, and they compare their model with a decentralized
system where operational and financial decisions are made
separately. Under the alternative assumption that the firm
stops operations if it goes bankrupt, Hu et al. [11] study a
model with coordinated inventory and financial decisions and
analyze it against the corresponding model with decentral-
ized decisions. The reader is referred to Hu et al. [9] for more
discussions along the line of Li et al. [14] and Hu et al. [11].
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The papers that are most closely related to ours are Chao
et al. [5] and Li et al. [14], but there are significant differ-
ences. First, compared with Chao et al. [5] which focuses on
a self-financing firm, our study extends this work by allowing
short-term financing. We remark that the inclusion of short-
term financing has important economic implications, as there
are many financing companies that provide short-term loans
to small companies. For example, American Microloan is
such a company that provides cash advances and quick loans
to small businesses in the form of short-term working capi-
tal.1 If firms ignore such financing opportunities and solely
rely on their own capital, they may lose potential profits and
development opportunities. On the other hand, the inclusion
of short-term financing also brings significant challenges on
the firm’s operational and financing decisions. When the firm
is self-financed, its optimal policy has a very simple modi-
fied base-stock type, as afore mentioned. In contrast, when
short-term financing is an option for the firm, its optimal pol-
icy becomes much more complicated even if the loan interest
rate is a constant. Technically speaking, the simple policy
structure in Chao et al. [5] is due to the fact that the bivari-
ate value function can be fully decoupled into two univariate
functions; whereas in our model, the value function can only
be decoupled within a certain range, which results in more
challenging analysis and more complicated policy structure.
In addition, while Chao et al. [5] are unable to deal with fea-
tures such as physical holding cost and bankruptcy cost, we
can incorporate them into our model and show that they do
not significantly change our structural results. We note that
Shi et al. [17] also analyze a dynamic inventory control prob-
lem under cash-flow constraints, but they focus on developing
simple myopic heuristic policies and bounds for the control
parameters; their demand process, however, is allowed to be
nonstationary.
Second, compared with Li et al. [14] in which the firm’s
objective is to maximize the expected present value of divi-
dends net of capital subscription, the objective in our study
is to maximize the firm’s expected terminal wealth. Under
Li et al. [14]’s setting, a salient result is that the firm’s prob-
lem can be simplified to have a single-state variable (i.e., the
inventory level). The reason is that, as subscribing capital and
issuing dividend have the same marginal value in Li et al. [14],
the firm’s capital has a constant marginal value in each period,
thus the dynamic program can be formulated to include the
inventory level as the single state variable. In contrast, as in
our setting the deposit and borrowing have different marginal
values, the firm’s capital does not have a constant marginal
value, thus both the inventory level and the capital level must
be included as state variables, resulting in a multidimensional
state space. Because of this key difference, our analysis and
results are quite different from Li et al. [14]’s.
1 Refer to http://www.americanmicroloan.com/.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section
2, we present the model and its mathematical formulation
in detail. In Section 3, we study the structural properties of
the model and the firm’s optimal control policy. In Section
4, we extend the base model to the case with physical hold-
ing cost, the case with reorganization bankruptcy, and the
case with fixed borrowing cost. We conclude the article in
Section 5 with some possible future directions. All technical
proofs are given in the Appendix. Throughout the article, we
use “increasing” and “decreasing” in nonstrict sense, that
is, they represent “non-decreasing” and “non-increasing”,
respectively. In addition, for any real number x, we define
x+ = max{x, 0} and x− = max{−x, 0}.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a capital-constrained firm that sells a product over
a planning horizon of N periods, indexed by n = 1, . . . , N .
At the beginning of the planning horizon (i.e., period one),
the firm has an initial capital w1 and inventory stocking level
x1, with w1 > 0 and x1 ≥ 0. In each period n, the firm can
replenish its inventory from a supplier with a unit cost c. The
delivery leadtime is zero, implying that an order placed at the
beginning of a period is delivered in the same period. The
product has a fixed selling price p and a random demand
Dn in period n. Following Hu et al. [11] and Li et al. [14],
we assume D1, . . . , DN are independent and identically dis-
tributed nonnegative random variables, with f (·) and F(·)
being their density and distribution functions, respectively.
We also assume that any unsold product in a period is carried
to the next period, any excess demand in a period is lost, and
any unsold inventory at the end of the planning horizon is
salvaged at a value γ per unit with γ ≤ c.
Besides using its own capital, the firm can borrow short-
term loans to finance its inventory in each period. The poten-
tial sources for such loans include the firm’s shareholders,
its supplier, third-party companies, or the banks. Note that
if the short-term loans are from the firm’s shareholders, then
they can be regarded as (short-term) capital subscriptions;
while if the loans are from the firm’s supplier, then they can
be regarded as trade credits. Let ρ(z) denote the “total loan
interest” in one period if the loan size is z, referred to as the
“loan interest function.” Then, ρ ′(z) can be regarded as the
“marginal interest function,” and for convenience we shall
refer to it as the “interest rate function.” As the interest rate
is positive and usually increases in the loan size, we assume
that ρ(z) is increasing and convex in z with ρ(0) = 0 and
ρ ′(0) > 0 being the minimum interest rate. In addition, the
firm can deposit its extra capital into a savings account with
a fixed interest rate d per period. It is reasonable to assume
0 ≤ d < ρ ′(0), as in practice the loan rate is always higher
than the deposit rate. This assumption also ensures that the
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firm will never borrow a loan while deposit capital in the same
period. We further assume ρ ′(0) < (p − c)/c, as otherwise
the firm will never borrow and the problem then reduces to
the model with a self-financing firm, which has been studied
in Chao et al. [5]. Note that the loan interest function ρ(z)
described above includes many commonly used lending con-
tracts as special cases. Two examples are: (1) a contract with
a loan rate b1 up to a loan size K and a higher rate b2 beyond
K , specified by ρ(z) = b1z + (b2 − b1)(z − K)+ (where
b2 > b1); and (2) a contract with a borrowing cap K , given
by any increasing convex function ρ(z) but that is defined on
the range z ≥ K by ρ(z) = ρ(K) + (p − c)(z − K)+/c. In
the latter case, the firm will never borrow more than K .
The sequence of events in each period n is as follows:
First, the firm reviews its inventory level xn and capital level
wn. Second, the firm decides on the order quantity for this
period, denoted as qn, pays the ordering cost cqn by its own
capital and/or short-term loans, and deposits the extra capital
(if any) to the savings account. Third, the order arrives and
the inventory level is increased to yn, with yn = xn + qn.
Fourth, the random demand Dn is realized and the sales rev-
enue p min{yn, Dn} is collected. At the end of the period, the
firm receives its deposited capital and interest from the sav-
ings account (if any), or pays the principal and interest of the
short-term loan (if any). In case the firm does not have enough
capital to pay the entire principal or interest of the loan, we
assume that the firm pays all its capital and the remaining
debt is carried to the next period as the firm’s negative cap-
ital. Note that in this model, the inventory holding cost is
implicitly included as the opportunity cost of capital and the
shortage cost is implicitly included as the lost revenue. In
addition, for simplicity we first assume in this section that
there is no cost for physically holding the inventory; we will
relax this assumption later in Section 4.1.
Let (xn, wn) denote the state of the system in period n.
Then, with the preceding description and assumptions of the
model, the state transitions from period n to period n+1 can
be given as follows:
xn+1 = (xn + qn − Dn)+; (1)
wn+1 = p min{xn + qn, Dn} + (1 + d)(wn − cqn)+
− (cqn − wn)+ − ρ((cqn − wn)+). (2)
The transition of the inventory level follows directly from the
lost-sales assumption; while the transition of the capital level
consists of four terms. The first term on the right hand side of
(2) is the sales revenue in period n, the second one is the cap-
ital received from the savings account, and the last two terms
are the payments for the principal and interest of the short-
term loan, respectively. Note that under our assumptions, the
firm deposits if and only if wn ≥ cqn and the deposit amount
is (wn − cqn)+; while it borrows if and only if wn < cqn and
the loan size is (cqn − wn)+.
Note from (2) that even though the firm starts with a pos-
itive capital in period one (i.e., w1 > 0), it may encounter
a negative capital level in a future period (unless the firm
never borrows). Thus, an important issue is whether the firm
is allowed to operate with a negative capital level. Following
Hu and Sobel [10] and Li et al. [14], we assume that the firm
continues to operate with a negative capital level. However,
in contrast to these two studies, we will consider the case
where the firm does not have to pay a default penalty. As dis-
cussed earlier, to prevent the firm from overborrowing, the
lender can choose an appropriate loan interest function ρ(z),
for example, by choosing ρ(z) = ρ(K)+ (p − c)(z−K)/c
on z ≥ K , then the firm will never borrow more than K . In
addition, the lender can choose its protection level by varying
the value K . In particular, if K = 0, then the lender opts to
not engage in any business with the firm. In practice, ρ(z)
is probably an outcome of a negotiation process between the
firm and its lender, which balances the benefits and risks of
both parties. We will relax this assumption later in Section
4.2 and study the case when the firm enters a reorganization
bankruptcy when its capital level is negative.
Having described the state, actions, and state transitions,
we now turn to the objective of the firm. Following the
many studies in mathematical finance (e.g., Karatzas [12];
Pliska [16]), we assume that the firm’s objective is to maxi-
mize its expected terminal wealth (capital) at the end of the
planning horizon. That is, the firm’s decision problem is: for
given w1 > 0 and x1 ≥ 0,
max
y1,...,yN
E[wN+1 + γ xN+1], (3)
subject to state transitions (1) and (2), and yn = xn+qn ≥ xn,
for n = 1, . . . , N .
Denote by Vn(x, w), the maximum expected terminal
wealth, given that the inventory level is x and the capital
level is w at the beginning of period n. Then, the following
dynamic program can be formulated to analyze the firm’s
decision problem (3): for 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
Vn(x, w) = max
y≥x E[Vn+1((y − Dn)
+
, p min{y, Dn}
+ φ (w − c(y − x)))], (4)
where φ(s) = (1 + d)s+ − s− − ρ(s−), and the boundary
condition is
VN+1(x, w) = w + γ x. (5)
Although the firm only needs to make an ordering decision
in each period, there exist complex trade-offs in making this
decision. Similar to other stochastic inventory control prob-
lems, the main trade-off is still between too many and too
few. However, in contrast to those problems without financ-
ing considerations, the cost and benefit of ordering a certain
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
188 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 61 (2014)
quantity in our problem is much more complex to analyze,
resulting from the nonlinear financing (revenue) function
φ(·) and multiperiod interactions. By analyzing the struc-
tural properties of the problem, we will characterize the firm’s
optimal policy in the next section.
3. OPTIMAL POLICY
We begin our analysis by examining the structural prop-
erties of problem (4). The following lemma provides some
important properties that will help characterize the firm’s
optimal ordering policy.
LEMMA 1: Forn = 1, . . . , N , the following results hold:
i. Vn(x − z, w + pz) is strictly increasing in w and z;
ii. Vn(x, w) is concave in (x, w).
Lemma 1(i) shows that the firm’s expected terminal wealth
will be increased if it has more initial capital, and the firm
always prefers to sell inventory in exchange of capital. Both
results are intuitive. In addition, the concavity of Vn(x, w)
indicates that the marginal value of additional inventory
(resp., capital) decreases if the firm has more initial inventory
(resp., capital). This result is also intuitive, as the probability
of selling additional inventory (resp., using additional capital
to purchase product) decreases when the firm has more initial
inventory (resp., capital).
With the above properties of the value function, we pro-
ceed to study the firm’s optimal inventory policy. We first
provide a simple upper bound for the firm’s optimal ordering
quantity. To this end, we define a threshold capital level w
as follows: if the convex function (p − c)w/c + ρ(−w) is
strictly increasing in w on w ≤ 0, then w = −∞; otherwise,
w is defined as the largest minimizer of (p−c)w/c+ρ(−w)
over w ≤ 0. Since ρ(·) is convex, w is uniquely defined with
w ≤ 0.
PROPOSITION 1: For n = 1, . . . , N , given the state
(x, w) at the beginning of period n, the firm will not order
more than (w − w)+/c.
According to Proposition 1, if w ≤ w in period n, then it is
optimal for the firm not to order in period n regardless of the
starting inventory level in this period. The intuition behind
this result is as follows. When w ≤ w, the firm is in debt of
−w at the beginning of period n; thus it must resort to short-
term loan for ordering, with a marginal financing cost at least
1 + ρ ′(−w) per unit of capital. On the other hand, the mar-
ginal revenue of ordering is at most p/c per unit of capital,
where p/c is the price to cost ratio for the product. From the
definition of w, it is known that 1 + ρ ′(−w) is greater than
p/c when w ≤ w. Thus, in this case it is not justifiable to
borrow from the lender and order any quantity. Proposition
1 also shows that, if w > w, then the firm’s optimal ordering
quantity has an upper bound (w −w)/c, which is equivalent
to requiring the firm’s debt level after ordering to be no lower
than w. This result is consistent with the first result, as the
firm has no incentive to order more product once its capital
level drops to w. Observe that w only depends on the loan
interest function ρ(·) and the profit to cost ratio (p − c)/c.
Thus, the lender of the short-term loan can indirectly control
the firm’s borrowing limit via the selection of ρ(·).
After obtaining the upper bound of the optimal ordering
quantity, we proceed to characterize the firm’s optimal inven-
tory policy. It can be seen that the objective function on the
right hand side of (4) depends on the state variables x and
w only through w + cx. For convenience, for period n with
state (xn, wn), we denote Rn = wn + cxn. Intuitively, Rn can
be interpreted as the “equity level” of the firm with on-hand
inventory evaluated at the purchasing cost c. Then, the opti-
mality Eq. (4) can be rewritten, after introducing a new value
function V˜n(x, R), as
V˜n(x, R) := Vn(x, w) = max
y≥x πn(y, R),
where
πn(y, R) = E[V˜n+1((y − Dn)+,
(p − c) min{y, Dn} + φ(R − cy) + cy)]. (6)
For any R, let y∗n(R) be the maximizer of the optimization
problem maxy≥0 πn(y, R). Following Lemma 1, it is easy to
show that πn(y, R) is concave in (y, R); thus, πn(y, R) is
increasing in y when y ≤ y∗n(R) and it is decreasing in y
when y ≥ y∗n(R). Hence, the firm’s optimal inventory policy
can be characterized as follows.
THEOREM 1: For n = 1, . . . , N , given the state (x, w) at
the beginning of period n, an equity-level-dependent base-
stock inventory policy y∗n(R), where R = w+cx, is optimal.
Specifically,
i. if x < y∗n(R), then it is optimal to replenish the
inventory level to y∗n(R);
ii. if x ≥ y∗n(R), then it is optimal not to order.
Theorem 1 shows that the firm’s optimal order-up-to level
depends on its equity level R rather than the inventory level
x and the capital level w individually. However, it does not
characterize the properties of y∗n(R) as a function of R. For
example, it does not specify the relationship between y∗n(R)
and R/c. If y∗n(R) ≤ R/c, then the optimal ordering policy
only uses the firm’s own capital and does not borrow from
the lender. In that case, we would have either x ≥ y∗n(R) or
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x < y∗n(R), and only in the latter case ordering (using the
firm’s own capital) is necessary. In contrast, if y∗n(R) > R/c,
then the firm has to borrow from the lender to reach the opti-
mal order-up-to level. In this case, if x ≥ y∗n(R), then the
firm has a negative capital level w at the beginning of period
n and it is optimal not to order; while if x < y∗n(R), then
the firm needs to borrow from the lender to place an order of
quantity y∗n(R) − x.
In what follows, we will focus on studying the properties
of y∗n(R) for different values of R. First, the following result
provides an upper bound for y∗n(R), which also shows that
the optimal order-up-to level is equal to zero when the equity
level R is below w.
COROLLARY 1: For n = 1, . . . , N , y∗n(R) ≤ (R −
w)+/c. In particular, y∗n(R) = 0 when R ≤ w.
Corollary 1 is a direct application of Theorem 1 and Propo-
sition 1. To see this, suppose that the state is (x, R − cx) at
the beginning of period n. By Theorem 1, the firm’s opti-
mal ordering quantity is (y∗n(R) − x)+. Since the firm’s
optimal order quantity at this state has an upper bound
(R − cx − w)+/c by Proposition 1, it follows that (y∗n(R) −
x)+ ≤ (R−cx−w)+/c. Then, the corollary directly follows
by setting x = 0.
We next study the properties of y∗n(R) when R > w. We
begin by defining two sequences of concave functions and
two sequences of control parameters as follows: GdN+1(y) =
(γ − c)y, and for n = 1, . . . , N ,
Gdn(y) = (1 + d)N−n ((p − c)E [min{y, Dn}] − dcy)
+ E [Gdn+1(max{adn+1, (y − Dn)+})] , (7)
Gbrn (y) = Gdn(y) − (1 + d)N−n(ρ ′(0) − d)cy, (8)
where adN+1 = 0, and for n = 1, . . . , N , adn and abrn are
maximizers of Gdn(y) and Gbrn (y) over y ≥ 0, respectively.
Note that Gdn(y) and adn are independent of the loan interest
function ρ(·); while Gbrn (y) and abrn depend on ρ(·), but only
through the minimum loan interest rate ρ ′(0). As will be seen
later, the two functions Gdn(y) and Gbrn (y) play determining
roles in the strategy of the firm on the range of equity lev-
els R ≥ cabrn ; more specifically, cadn and cabrn are the critical
points of the equity levels for the firm to set its ordering strat-
egy as if there were infinite capital and to use up all capital to
replenish inventory but without borrowing, respectively. The
following lemma presents some important properties on adn
and abrn .
LEMMA 2: The control parameters adn and abrn , n =
1, . . . , N , satisfy
i. F−1
(
p−(1+d)c
p−c
)
≥ ad1 ≥ ad2 ≥ · · · ≥ adN =
F−1
(
p−(1+d)c
p−γ
)
;
ii. F−1
(
p−(1+ρ ′(0))c
p−c
)
≥ abr1 ≥ abr2 ≥ · · · ≥ abrN =
F−1
(
p−(1+ρ ′(0))c
p−γ
)
;
iii. for n = 1, . . . , N , abrn is decreasing in ρ ′(0), with
abrn ≤ adn ; in addition, for n = 1, . . . , N − 1,
if adn+1 ≤ F−1
(
p−(1+ρ ′(0))c
p−c
)
, then abrn ≥ adn+1;
otherwise, abrn = F−1
(
p−(1+ρ ′(0))c
p−c
)
;
where F−1(·) is the inverse function of the distribution
function F(·).
According to Lemma 2, ad1 , . . . , adN and abr1 , . . . , abrN are
two sequences of decreasing numbers, with adn ≥ abrn > 0
for each n. With these numbers, the following theorem shows
that, for each period n, y∗n(R) exhibits a very simple structure
when R ≥ cabrn .
THEOREM 2: For n = 1, . . . , N , the following results
hold:
i. when R ≥ cadn, y∗n(R) = adn ; and when cabrn ≤ R ≤
cadn, y
∗
n(R) = R/c;
ii. when R ≥ cabrn and R ≥ cx, the value function
V˜n(x, R) can be decomposed as
V˜n(x, R) = Gdn(max{adn , x}) + Hn(R),
where
Hn(R) =
{
πn(R/c, R) − Gdn(adn ), cabrn ≤R ≤ cadn;
(1 + d)N−n+1R, R ≥ cadn.
Theorem 2 shows that the firm’s optimal order-up-to level
y∗n(R) is the constant adn when R ≥ cadn. This is the case when
the firm has a high-equity level R, resulting from either a
high-inventory level x or a high-capital level w. In this case,
since y∗n(R) ≤ R/c, it is optimal for the firm to either not
order (if x ≥ adn ) or raise its inventory level to adn by using
its own capital (if x < adn ). Since adn is independent of the
firm’s equity level R and the loan interest function ρ(·), the
firm having a high-equity level totally ignores its capital sta-
tus and acts like a firm without the capital constraint in this
period.
When cabrn ≤ R ≤ cadn, Theorem 2 shows that the firm’s
optimal order-up-to level y∗n(R) is R/c. This is the case when
the firm has a moderate-equity level, which is not high enough
for the firm to ignore its capital status but is still sufficient
to avoid the short-term loan. In this case, it is optimal for
the firm to either not order (if w ≤ 0) or raise its inventory
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level to R/c by using up all its capital (if w > 0). Thus, the
firm with a moderate equity level does not need to resort to
short-term financing and acts like a self-financing firm in this
period. Note from Lemma 2 that the critical equity level cabrn
decreases in the minimum loan interest rate, ρ ′(0). This is
quite intuitive, as the firm is more reluctant to borrow if the
introductory loan rate becomes higher.
The second part of Theorem 2 indicates that, if the firm has
no debt and meanwhile owns a sufficient equity at the begin-
ning of a period, then its optimal expected terminal wealth
is independently determined by its inventory level and its
equity level. This decomposition result eventually leads to
the simple structure of the firm’s optimal order-up-to level
when its equity level is high or moderate. In contrast, when
the firm’s equity level is low, the decomposition result does
not hold anymore; and as a result, as will be seen later, the
firm’s optimal order-up-to level becomes more complicated.
Having shown the structure of y∗n(R) for the ranges R ≤ w
and R ≥ cabrn , we now study the remaining case when
w < R < cabrn . We start our analysis from the last period
N , where the result is given in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: For the last period N , when w <
R < cabrN , the firm’s optimal order-up-to level y∗N(R) is an
increasing function of R, given by
y∗N(R)
= sup
{
y ≥ R+/c
∣∣∣ F(y) ≤ p − c
(
1 + ρ ′(cy − R))
p − γ
}
.
(9)
From Proposition 2, when w < R < cabrN , y∗N(R) is
determined by the distribution function of the demand and
the loan rate function. Given that the firm is solving a
newsvendor-type problem in the last period, y∗N(R) could
be interpreted as the critical fractile solution with a unit
underage cost of p − c(1 + ρ ′(cy − R)) and a unit over-
age cost of c(1 + ρ ′(cy −R))− γ , where both costs depend
on the loan size cy − R. As a special case of Proposition 2,
when the interest function ρ(·) is piecewise linear, that is, for
some sequences of increasing numbers bi and Ki satisfying
d < b1 < · · · < bm+1 = (p−c)/c and 0 < K1 < · · · < Km,
ρ(·) is given by
ρ(z) = b1z +
m∑
i=1
(bi+1 − bi)(z − Ki)+,
we can compute y∗N(R) in a simple explicit form. In this
case, the interest rate function ρ ′(·) is a step function and
(9) can be greatly simplified. To present the result, let abiN =
F−1
(
p−c(1+bi )
p−γ
)
, i = 1, . . . , m. Then, it can be shown that
0 < abmN < · · · < ab1N .
COROLLARY 2: If the loan interest function is piecewise
linear, then when −Km = w < R < cabrN = cab1N , the optimal
order-up-to level y∗N(R) is given by
y∗N(R)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(R + Km)/c, −Km < R < cabmN − Km;
a
bm
N , ca
bm
N − Km ≤ R < cabmN − Km−1;
(R + Km−1)/c, cabmN − Km−1 ≤ R < cabm−1N − Km−1;
.
.
.
.
.
.
a
b1
N , ca
b1
N − K1 ≤ R < cab1N .
Therefore, when the loan interest function ρ(·) is a piece-
wise linear convex function with m + 1 pieces, the firm’s
optimal order-up-to level y∗N(R) on R ∈ (w, cabrN) is com-
pletely characterized bym constants andm affine functions of
R. The m constants correspond to the ideal base-stock levels
with the m different loan rates b1, . . . , bm; while the m affine
functions satisfy cy∗N(R) − R = Ki , i = 1, . . . , m, and they
are determined by the m kinks of ρ(z) when z = K1, . . . , Km.
We now proceed to study, for a general period n, the struc-
ture of y∗n(R) on the range w < R < cabrn . Given the result in
Proposition 2 for the last period, it is conceivable that y∗n(R)
does not have a simple structure when w < R < cabrn . Then,
what can be said about the optimal order-up-to level for this
range? Toward this end, we first use the following numerical
example to explore some insights.
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose the planning horizon N = 3, the
selling price of the product p = 1.3, the unit cost c = 1, the
salvage value γ = 0.5, and the demand in each period is uni-
formly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. The deposit interest
rate d = 0.05, and the loan interest function ρ(z) = 0.1z.
That is, the lender uses a flat loan rate of 0.1 and no borrowing
limit. In this example, w = −∞, and the control parameters
for period two are abr2 = 0.5775 and ad2 = 0.6705. The firm’s
optimal order-up-to level in period two, y∗2 (R), as a function
of its equity level R is shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 1 shows that y∗2 (R) has a simple structure when
R ≥ cabr2 , which is consistent with our analytical results in
Theorem 2. When R ≤ cabr2 , however, y∗2 (R) is complicated
and even not monotone in R. Recall that y∗3 (R) is increasing
inR by Proposition 2. Thus, y∗n(R) is in general not monotone
in R except for the last period N . The implication of these
results is that, while it is always optimal for the firm to order
more in the last period when it has more capital, it can be opti-
mal for the firm to order less when it has more capital and
when there is more than one remaining period. Intuitively,
this complex optimal ordering behavior of the firm is a result
of two competing effects of having more capital. The posi-
tive effect is that, with more capital in hand the firm will need
less short-term loan, thus it leads to lower financing cost to
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Figure 1. Optimal order-up-to level y∗2 (R). [Color figure
can be viewed in the online issues which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
achieve the same order-up-to level, which induces the firm
to order more. In contrast, the negative effect of having more
capital is that, the marginal value of revenue from sales would
decrease due to the concavity of the value function, thus sat-
isfying demand would become less attractive, which induces
the firm to order less. Our results above show that the first
effect always dominates the second in a single-period prob-
lem, leading to a monotone optimal order-up-to level with
regard to the firm’s capital. However, if there are multiple
periods to go, then either effect can dominate the other one,
resulting in the nonmonotone behavior as demonstrated in
Figure 1.
Besides its complexity, Figure 1 also demonstrates two
interesting properties of the optimal order-up-to level y∗2 (R).
First, y∗2 (R) ≥ R/c when R ≤ cabr2 ; and second, y∗2 (R)
becomes flat when R is sufficiently low. An interesting ques-
tion is that, to what extent these two properties remain true for
the general setting. In the rest of this section, we will address
these two issues.
As discussed earlier in this section, the first property
implies that when R ≤ cabr2 , the firm has to borrow from
the lender to reach the optimal order-up-to level y∗2 (R) in
period two. The following result summarizes our findings
on the comparison between the optimal order-up-to level for
period n, y∗n(R), and R/c.
PROPOSITION 3: For n = N and N − 1, y∗n(R) ≥ R/c
when R ≤ cabrn . Moreover, if the interest rate d = 0, then the
above result holds for n = 1, . . . , N .
Proposition 3 shows that the first property observed in the
numerical example is always satisfied for the last two peri-
ods. In addition, when there is no savings account for deposit
(equivalent to the case with d = 0), this property is satisfied
for an arbitrary period n. Unfortunately, for the case with a
savings account of positive interest rate d , we are unable to
obtain this property when there are three or more remain-
ing periods. In that case, because of the complex multiperiod
interactions, it is not clear which of the following options is
more profitable: (1) use up all the firm’s capital and even bor-
row some from the lender to build up inventory; (2) use part
of the firm’s capital to build up inventory while deposit the
remaining capital to earn interest. Option (1) always domi-
nates option (2) when the firm cannot earn deposit interest;
however, there is no clear dominating relationship between
these two options when there is a positive deposit rate and
more than two periods remain.
We next discuss the second property exhibited in Figure 1,
that is, the optimal order-up-to level y∗n(R) is a constant for
small equity level R. From the result of Proposition 2, it can
be seen that for an arbitrary increasing convex interest func-
tion ρ(·), this second property is not satisfied even for the
last period. Hence, it probably results from our adoption of a
linear loan interest function. Given that the linear loan inter-
est function is the simplest loan scheme the lender could use,
it is interesting to investigate whether the second property is
generally true under this specific setting. Therefore, in the
rest of this section, we will focus on the linear loan interest
function: ρ(z) = ρ ′(0)z = bz, with d < b < (p−c)/c. Note
by Theorem 2 that, y∗n(R) = min{adn , R/c} when R ≥ cabrn ,
n = 1, . . . , N . In the following, we show that for the linear
loan interest function, the optimal order-up-to level y∗n(R) in
period n is always equal to a constant when the equity level
R is sufficiently low.
Before stating our main result, we need to introduce two
more sequences of control parameters. First, denote abN+1 =
0, and for n = 1, . . . , N , denote abn as the maximizer ofGbn(y)
over y ≥ 0, where
Gbn(y) = (1 + b)N−n ((p − c)E [min{y, Dn}] − bcy)
+ E [Gbn+1(max{abn+1, (y − Dn)+})] ,
and GbN+1(y) = (γ − c)y. Second, denote ablN+1 = ∞,
ablN = abN , and for n = 1, . . . , N − 1,
abln =
cabln+1 − (p − (1 + b)c)abn
(1 + b)c . (10)
The following lemma establishes some important proper-
ties on these control parameters.
LEMMA 3: The control parameters abn and abln , n =
1, . . . , N , satisfy
i. F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−c
)
≥ ab1 ≥ ab2 ≥ · · · ≥ abN =
F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−γ
)
;
ii. −p−(1+b)c
bc
F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−c
)
< abl1 < a
bl
2 < · · · <
ablN = F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−γ
)
.
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Lemma 3 shows that, ab1 , . . . , abN is a sequence of decreas-
ing positive numbers, while abl1 , . . . , ablN is a sequence of
increasing numbers. In addition, it follows from Lemmas
2 and 3 that abN = ablN = abrN , and abln < abrn for n =
1, . . . , N − 1. With these control parameters, our main result
is summarized in the following theorem.
THEOREM 3: If the loan interest functionρ(z) = bz, with
d < b < (p − c)/c, then for n = 1, . . . , N ,
i. when R ≤ cabln , y∗n(R) = abn;
ii. when R ≤ cabln and 0 ≤ x ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c , the value
function V˜n(x, R) can be decomposed as
V˜n(x, R) = Gbn(max{abn , x}) + (1 + b)N−n+1R.
Theorem 3 shows that, under the linear loan interest func-
tion, the firm’s optimal order-up-to level y∗n(R) in period n
is flat at abn when R ≤ cabln . This confirms that the afore-
mentioned second property is always true under a linear loan
interest function. In this case, as y∗n(R) ≥ abln ≥ R/c, it is
optimal for the firm to either not order (if x ≥ abn) or raise
its inventory level to abn by borrowing from the lender (if
x < abn). Similar to the case with R ≥ cadn, as abn does not
depend on the firm’s equity level R and the deposit interest
rate d, the firm with a low-equity level totally ignores its cap-
ital status and acts like a firm that is always in debt in this
period. In addition, Theorem 3 (ii) provides a decomposition
result similar to Theorem 2 (ii). Again, this result is crucial
in establishing the constant optimal order-up-to level when
the equity level is low.
With Theorems 2 and 3, the only interval of R where
y∗n(R) is not fully characterized under the linear loan interest
function is (cabln , cabrn ). For the last period, since ablN = abrN ,
y∗N(R) is fully characterized by these two theorems, with
y∗N(R) = max{abN , min{adN , R/c}}. When n < N , since abln
is strictly increasing in n while abrn is decreasing in n by
Lemmas 2 and 3, this interval becomes strictly larger when n
decreases. Based on the upper bound of abrn in Lemma 2 and
the lower bound of abln in Lemma 3, the width of the inter-
val is upper bounded by p−c
b
F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−c
)
. For instance,
in Example 1, abrn has an upper bound 2/3, abln has a lower
bound −4/3, and the width of the region (cabln , cabrn ) has an
upper bound of 2. Furthermore, note that this upper bound is
decreasing in b and converges to 0 as b tends to (p − c)/c.
Therefore, under the linear loan interest function with a high-
interest rate, the remaining interval where y∗n(R) is not fully
characterized is quite narrow. On the other hand, as seen from
the numerical example, in this narrow interval, the optimal
policy cannot be expected to have a nice analytical struc-
ture. We suspect that in this interval, the optimal order-up-to
level is decreasing first and then increasing (as observed in
Figure 1), but we are unable to theoretically prove this.
Finally, we remark that, in the trivial case where the loan
interest rate b is equal to the deposit interest rate d, the firm’s
optimal inventory policy in each period is an equity-level-
independent base-stock policy and its value function can be
completely decomposed. Specifically, for each period n =
1, . . . , N , y∗n(R) = adn and V˜n(x, R) = Gdn(max{adn , x}) +
(1 + d)N−n+1R for any x ≥ 0 and −∞ < R < ∞. This is
because, when d = b, φ(s) = (1+d)s for all s, so the firm’s
marginal financing cost is a constant regardless of its capital
level; thus there is no need to keep track of the capital level,
and the resulting problem becomes a classical multiperiod
newsvendor problem. This result can also be argued from a
different perspective: if the loan rate is the same as the sav-
ings rate, then the firm can be considered as the owner of the
bank that can freely borrow or deposit any amount of cap-
ital, hence the financing issue no longer exists in the firm’s
inventory management problem.
4. EXTENSIONS
In this section, we study three extensions of our base model,
which are the model with physical inventory cost, the model
with reorganization bankruptcy, and the model with fixed bor-
rowing cost. For the first two extensions, we will show that
most of our results and analysis continue to hold; while for the
third extension, the problem is much more complicated and
we characterize the optimal policy only for the last-period
problem.
4.1. Physical Holding Cost
So far, we have assumed that there is no cost of physically
holding the inventory; thus, the inventory holding cost only
consists of the opportunity cost of capital. In this section, we
relax this assumption and study a model with physical hold-
ing cost. Specifically, in addition to all the model assumptions
in Section 2, we assume that the firm incurs a physical hold-
ing cost rate h on unsold inventory at the end of each period.
In the following, we show how our model and results are
extended to this new model setting.
Because the physical holding cost only affects the firm’s
cash flow rather than its material flow, the state transition on
the inventory in (1) remains the same, while the transition on
the capital level in (2) needs to be modified as
wn+1 = p min{xn + qn, Dn} − h(xn + qn − Dn)+
+ φ(wn − cqn).
Accordingly, the dynamic program in (4) needs to be modified
as: for 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
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Vn(x, w) = max
y≥x E[Vn+1((y − Dn)
+
,
p min{y, Dn} − h(y − Dn)+ + φ (w − c(y − x)))].
As in Section 3, we aim to characterize the firm’s optimal
ordering policy in each period. Following similar analysis to
our base model, it is easy to show that Lemma 1, Proposi-
tion 1, Theorem 1, and Corollary 1 continue to hold under
this new model setting. Therefore, an equity-level-dependent
base-stock policy y∗n(R) remains optimal for period n, with
y∗n(R) = 0 when R ≤ w. In addition, for the last period N ,
Theorem 2 remains true, and Proposition 2 and Corollary 2
also hold after replacing γ by γ −h (as after taking the phys-
ical holding cost into account, the “effective” salvage value
for unsold product at the end of period N becomes γ −h). For
a general period n, after redefining some control parameters,
Theorem 2 becomes partially true and Theorem 3 continues
to hold. In the following, we present the results which are par-
allel to Theorems 2 and 3. Before that, we need to redefine
the control parameters.
For k = d, b, denote akN+1 = 0, and for n = 1, . . . , N ,
denote akn as the maximizer of Gkn(y) over y ≥ 0, where
Gkn(y) = (1 + k)N−n
(
(p − c + h)E [min{y, Dn}]
− (kc + h)y)+ E[Gkn+1(max{akn+1, (y − Dn)+})] ,
and GkN+1(y) = (γ − c)y. In addition, for n = 1, . . . , N , abln
is defined in the same way as that in Section 3, except that in
its definition abn should be replaced by what is defined in this
section.
THEOREM 4: For n = 1, . . . , N , when R ≥ (c +∑N−n
i=1 (1 + d)−ih)adn , y∗n(R) = adn . In addition, if ρ(z) = bz
with d < b < (p− c)/c, then for n = 1, . . . , N , y∗n(R) = abn
when R ≤ cabln .
From Theorem 4, the firm’s optimal order-up-to level
y∗n(R) is still a constant when its equity level R is above
a certain level, and this level converges to that in Theorem 2
when h reduces to 0. In addition, for the special case with a
linear loan interest function, y∗n(R) is also a constant when
the equity level R is below cabln , which is essentially the same
as that in Theorem 3. For a general loan interest function,
however, the characterization of y∗n(R) appears to be very
complicated when w < R < (c +∑N−ni=1 (1 + d)−ih)adn , and
it is difficult to obtain further results in this interval.
Furthermore, for the special case when ρ(z) = dz, the
firm’s optimal inventory policy in period n is still an equity-
level-independent base-stock policy with the base-stock level
adn . This is because the firm’s marginal financing cost remains
a constant despite the physical holding cost. Therefore, there
is still no need to keep track of the capital level, and the
resulting problem is also a classical multiperiod newsvendor
problem.
4.2. Reorganization Bankruptcy
In the preceding analysis, we have assumed that the firm
does not go bankrupt when it ends up with a negative cap-
ital level in a period. In this section, we extend our base
model to include the reorganization bankruptcy, or “Chap-
ter 11” bankruptcy under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.2 Under
the reorganization bankruptcy, the firm continues to operate
but incurs a default penalty cost if it has a negative capital
level at the beginning of a period. Mathematically, follow-
ing Li et al. [14], we assume that the firm incurs a default
penalty ηn(wn) in state (xn, wn) at the beginning of period
n, where ηn(w) is a convex decreasing function in w with
ηn(w) = 0 when w ≥ 0, n = 1, . . . , N . In addition, we
assume that the firm’s objective is to maximize its expected
wealth minus default penalty at the end of the planning hori-
zon, i.e., E[wN+1 + γ xN+1 − ηN+1(wN+1 + γ xN+1)], where
ηN+1(w) is also a convex decreasing function in w with
ηN+1(w) = 0 when w ≥ 0. With other model assumptions
of Section 2 remaining in place, we show in the following
how our model and results are extended to this new model
setting.
Since the default penalty only affects the firm’s cash flow,
the state transition on the inventory in (1) remains unchanged,
while the capital level in (2) is modified to
wn+1 = p min{xn + qn, Dn} + φ(wn − ηn(wn) − cqn).
Accordingly, the dynamic program in (4) needs to be modified
to: for 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
Vn(x, w) = max
y≥x E[Vn+1((y − Dn)
+
,
p min{y, Dn} + φ (w − ηn(w) − c(y − x)))],
and the boundary condition (5) is modified as VN+1(x, w) =
w + γ x − ηN+1(w + γ x).
We still aim to characterize the firm’s optimal ordering
policy in each period. With the reorganization bankruptcy,
it is easy to show that Lemma 1 continues to hold. In addi-
tion, Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 are also true after w being
substituted with w − ηn(w). This is because the effective
capital level reduces from w to w − ηn(w) due to the default
penalty ηn(w) in period n. Thus, an equity-level-dependent
base-stock policy y∗n(R) remains optimal for period n, where
R = w−ηn(w)+cx. Consequently, the problem also reduces
to the characterization of y∗n(R) for different values of R.
When R ≤ w, it is easy to show that Corollary 1 remains
true thus y∗n(R) = 0. In addition, since ηn(w) = 0 when
w ≥ 0 for n = 1, . . . , N + 1, by following exactly the
2 http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/
BankruptcyBasics/Process.aspx.
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same analysis as that for our base model, Theorem 2 con-
tinues to hold after introducing the default penalty. Hence,
for each period n, y∗n(R) = min{adn , R/c} when R ≥ cabrn .
Thus, again the firm has an equity-level-independent con-
stant optimal base-stock level as the equity level is high. This
result implies that the default penalty does not affect the firm’s
optimal order-up-to level as long as it has a moderate or high-
equity level. For the remaining region when w < R < cabrn ,
however, y∗n(R) depends on the default penalty functions and
its characterization becomes much more complicated. Nev-
ertheless, the comparison results between y∗n(R) and R/c in
Proposition 3 still hold. Thus, the insights generated from
these results are still valid.
We remark that, for the last period N , the firm’s decision
problem when R < cabrN is a special case of the risk-averse
newsvendor problem studied by Eeckhoudt et al. [7]. Follow-
ing their approach, it is easy to show that the firm’s optimal
order-up-to level y∗N(R) with the default penalty is lower
than that without default penalty, that is, the expression given
in (9). It means that the firm will order less after the reorga-
nization bankruptcy is introduced, which is quite intuitive. In
addition, unlike our base model and its extension with phys-
ical holding cost, the firm’s problem cannot be reduced to a
classical multiperiod newsvendor problem even if the loan
interest function is ρ(z) = dz, that is, the borrowing rate is
the same as the savings rate. This is because the firm incurs
different default penalties at different capital levels; conse-
quently, it must keep track of its capital level regardless of
the structure of the loan interest function.
4.3. Fixed Cost for Borrowing
In this subsection, we study another extension of our model
to include a fixed cost for borrowing. Specifically, we con-
sider the case where there is an additional fixed cost K for
the firm when it borrows, which can be, for example, the
processing cost of the loan.
When the fixed borrowing cost is in force, the state
transition on the capital level in (2) is changed to
wn+1 = p min{xn + qn, Dn} + φ(wn − cqn)
− K1{cqn > w+n },
where 1{·} is the indicator function, and K1{cqn > w+n } indi-
cates that the fixed cost K occurs when cqn > w+n , or equiv-
alently, the firm borrows capital in period n. Accordingly, the
dynamic program in (4) is modified to: for 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
Vn(x, w) = max
y≥x E[Vn+1((y − Dn)
+
, p min{y, Dn}
+ φ (w − c(y − x)) − K1{c(y − x) > w+})],
(11)
and the boundary condition remains VN+1(x, w) = w + γ x.
With the introduction of the fixed borrowing cost, the value
function Vn(x, w) in (11) is not a concave function anymore,
and nor can the objective function in (11) be written as a func-
tion of y and R = w + cx. Consequently, the firm’s optimal
policy becomes much more complex and it is in general no
longer an equity-level-dependent base-stock policy. To gain
some insights on the optimal policy, we provide below its
structure for the single-period model, that is, the last period
N . Single-period models have many applications, hence the
result below has independent interest, for example, inventory
and financial decisions for the fashion industry.
PROPOSITION 4: For the last period N , when w + cx ≥
cabrN , it is optimal for the firm to raise its inventory level to
as close to abrN as possible by using its own capital only;
while when w + cx ≤ w, it is optimal not to order. When
w < w+cx < cabrN , then it is optimal to either order w+/c by
using up its own capital or order up to y∗N(w + cx) [which is
given by Eq. (9)], depending on which decision gives higher
expected terminal wealth. In particular, when ρ(z) = bz with
d ≤ b < (p−c)/c andw ≥ 0, then there exists a critical point
r∗ such that it is optimal to order up to abN when w+cx ≤ r∗;
and it is optimal to order w+/c when r∗ < w + cx < cabN .
Proposition 4 shows that when the fixed borrowing cost
exists and the firm’s equity level R = w + cx falls into the
region (w, cabrN), the firm makes a tradeoff between borrow-
ing and not borrowing. When it is better not to borrow, then
the firm’s optimal decision is to use up its own capital to
purchase inventory; otherwise, it is optimal to order up to an
inventory level as if the fixed borrowing cost does not exist.
In particular, when the loan interest rate is a constant and the
firm has a nonnegative initial capital level, the proposition
further shows that the optimal policy is an (s, S)-type policy,
that is, it is optimal for the firm to borrow and raise the inven-
tory level to a constant abN when its equity level is below a
constant r∗. This result appears intuitive, because in the pres-
ence of the fixed cost, borrowing becomes unattractive if the
amount to be borrowed is not sufficiently large.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we study a dynamic inventory control prob-
lem for a capital-constrained firm which can borrow short-
term loans to finance its inventory. By analyzing the structural
properties of the firm’s problem, we show that an equity-level-
dependent base-stock inventory policy is optimal in each
period, where the equity level is the sum of the firm’s capi-
tal level and the value of its on-hand inventory evaluated at
the purchasing cost. We further study the dependency of the
firm’s optimal base-stock level on its equity level, and show
that optimal inventory policy is characterized by dividing the
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equity level into four intervals. We show that the optimal
base-stock level is very simple when the equity level falls
into three of the four intervals. More specifically, the opti-
mal base-stock level is a constant when the equity level is in
two of them, that is, when the equity level is either high or
low; and it equals the amount of products the equity can pur-
chase when it is in the third one. When the equity level is in
the remaining interval, however, the optimal base-stock level
is state-dependent and complicated. In this case, some par-
tial characterization results are obtained. In particular, when
the loan interest function is a linear function, we show that
the interval where the optimal base-stock level is not fully
characterized is quite narrow.
We also extend our model to the case with physical hold-
ing cost and the case with reorganization bankruptcy. In both
cases, we show that most of the results for the base model
continue to hold. In particular, an equity-level-dependent
base-stock inventory policy is optimal for both cases. In fact,
this result holds true under much more general settings, for
example, when demands are independent but not identically
distributed, and when the loan interest functions are time-
dependent. However, in these settings the characterization of
the optimal base-stock level becomes more complicated due
to the nonstationary data. Finally, a model with fixed borrow-
ing cost is also considered and the optimal policy for the last
period is analyzed.
Many interesting issues remain to be investigated. For
example, the selling price is fixed in our model. In reality,
the firm with abundant inventory but lack of capital tends
to decrease the selling price so as to attract more demand.
Thus, it is interesting to study the dynamic control problem
of both inventory and price. Another interesting direction is to
consider other types of bankruptcy (rather than the reorgani-
zation bankruptcy) when the firm’s capital level drops below
zero. For instance, under wipeout bankruptcy, or “Chapter 7”
bankruptcy under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the firm with
a negative capital level must halt operations and liquidate its
assets. In this case, the firm’s problem becomes an optimal
stopping problem. Finally, the loan interest function in our
model is independent of the firm’s state (i.e., the inventory and
capital levels). It is interesting to introduce such dependency
as asset-based financing, which is typical in many applica-
tions. These are just a few possible future directions, and it
appears that each of them will lead to a different optimal
solution structure which is worthy of study.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: The proof is by induction. By the boundary con-
dition (5), VN+1(x − z, w + pz) = (p − γ )z + γ x + w. Since p > γ , the
result obviously holds for n = N + 1. Now assume inductively that it holds
for n + 1. In what follows, we prove it for n.
We first prove (i) for n. According to (4), we have
Vn(x − z, w + pz) = max
y≥x−z E[Vn+1((y − Dn)
+
,
p min{y, Dn} + φ((p − c)z + w − c(y − x)))].
Since φ(s) = (1+d)s+ −(s− +ρ(s−)) is strictly increasing in s and p > c,
φ((p−c)z+w−c(y−x)) is strictly increasing in w and z. In addition, since
Vn+1(x, w) is strictly increasing in w according to the inductive assumption
and the decision constraint y ≥ x − z is less restrictive when z becomes
larger, it follows that Vn(x − z, w + pz) is strictly increasing in w and z.
We next prove (ii) for n. For convenience, define fn(y, s, D) =
Vn+1
(
(y − D)+, p min{y, D} + φ(s)). Then, the optimality equation (4)
can be rewritten as
Vn(x, w) = max
y≥x E [fn(y, w − c(y − x), Dn)] . (12)
To prove the concavity of Vn(x, w), we first prove that fn(y, s, D) is con-
cave in (y, s) for any given D. That is, for any (y1, s1), (y2, s2) and λ, with
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we need to show that
λfn(y1, s1, D) + (1 − λ)fn(y2, s2, D)
≤ fn(λy1 + (1 − λ)y2, λs1 + (1 − λ)s2, D).
Notice that for given D, both min{y, D} and φ(s) are concave functions.
Then,
λ min{y1, D} + (1 − λ) min{y2, D} ≤ min{λy1 + (1 − λ)y2, D};
λφ(s1) + (1 − λ)φ(s2) ≤ φ(λs1 + (1 − λ)s2).
Also notice that (y − D)+ = y − min{y, D}. Then, it follows that
λfn(y1, s1, D) + (1 − λ)fn(y2, s2, D)
= λVn+1((y1 − D)+, p min{y1, D} + φ(s1))
+ (1 − λ)Vn+1((y2 − D)+, p min{y2, D} + φ(s2))
≤ Vn+1(λ(y1 − D)+ + (1 − λ)(y2 − D)+, λ(p min{y1, D} + φ(s1))
+ (1 − λ)(p min{y2, D} + φ(s2)))
= Vn+1
((
λy1 + (1 − λ)y2
)
−
(
λ min{y1, D1} + (1 − λ) min{y2, D2}
)
,(
λφ(s1) + (1 − λ)φ(s2)
)
+ p
(
λ min{y1, D} + (1 − λ) min{y2, D}
))
≤ Vn+1((λy1 + (1 − λ)y2 − D)+, p min{λy1 + (1 − λ)y2, D}
+ φ(λs1 + (1 − λ)s2))
= fn(λy1 + (1 − λ)y2, λs1 + (1 − λ)s2, D),
where the first inequality is from the inductive assumption that Vn+1(x, w) is
concave in (x, w), and the second one is from the inductive assumption that
Vn+1(x − z, w + pz) is increasing in w and z. Thus, fn(y, s, D) is concave
in (y, s).
Sincefn(y, s, D) is concave in (y, s), it follows thatfn(y, w−c(y−x), D)
is concave in (y, x, w); and moreover, E[fn(y, w−c(y−x), Dn)] is concave
in (y, x, w). Since the constraint y ≥ x in (12) is a convex set, by apply-
ing Proposition B-4 of Heyman and Sobel [8], we obtain that Vn(x, w) is
concave in (x, w). Thus, the lemma holds for n. The proof is complete. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: The proposition is trivial when w = −∞.
Thus, we only prove the case when −∞ < w ≤ 0. By the optimality
equation (4), it suffices to prove that, for any given D,
Vn+1
(
(y − D)+, p min{y, D} + φ (w − c(y − x)))
= Vn+1
(
(y − D)+, −p(y − D)+ + py + φ (w − c(y − x)))
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is decreasing in y when y ≥ x + (w − w)+/c. Notice from Lemma 1 that
Vn+1(x − z, w + pz) is increasing in w and z. Thus, to obtain the desired
result, it suffices to prove py + φ (w − c(y − x)) is decreasing in y when
y ≥ x + (w − w)+/c.
Now suppose y ≥ x + (w − w)+/c. In this case, w − c(y − x) ≤
min{w, w} ≤ w ≤ 0. From the definition of φ(·), we have
py + φ (w − c(y − x)) = (p − c)y + w + cx − ρ(−(w − c(y − x))
= −[(p − c)(w − c(y − x))/c + ρ(−(w − c(y − x))] + px + pw/c.
By the definition of w and the convexity of ρ(·), (p − c)s/c − ρ(−s) is
decreasing in s when s ≤ w. Hence, it follows that py + φ (w − c(y − x))
is decreasing in y when y ≥ x + (w − w)+/c. The proof is complete. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: The proof of (i) is exactly the same as that of
Lemma 4 in Chao et al. [5]; thus it is omitted for brevity. In what follows,
for convenience, we first prove (iii) and then prove (ii).
We first prove (iii). For n = 1, . . . , N , from (8), we have
Gdn(y) − Gbrn (y) = c(1 + d)N−n(ρ′(0) − d)y.
Sinceadn andabrn are maximizers ofGdn(y) andGbrn (y), respectively, it follows
that
Gdn(a
d
n ) + Gbrn (abrn ) − Gbrn (adn ) − Gdn(abrn )
= c(1 + d)N−n(ρ′(0) − d)(adn − abrn ) ≥ 0.
This implies adn ≥ abrn . In addition, according to (8), when adn+1 ≤
F−1
(
p−(1+ρ′(0))c
p−c
)
, we have
(Gbrn )
′(adn+1) = (1 + d)N−n
(
(p − c)F¯ (adn+1) − ρ′(0)c
) ≥ 0.
Thus, it follows from the concavity of Gbrn (y) that adn+1 ≤ abrn . If adn+1 >
F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−c
)
, then
(Gbrn )
′
(
F−1
(
p − (1 + ρ′(0))c
p − c
))
= 0.
This proves abrn = F−1
(
p−(1+ρ′(0))c
p−c
)
. Thus, (iii) is satisfied.
We now prove (ii). First, since adN+1 = 0 and GdN+1(y) = (γ − c)y,
it can be easily calculated from (8) that abN = F−1
(
p−(1+ρ′(0))c
p−γ
)
. Sec-
ond, since E
[
Gdn+1(max{adn+1, (y − Dn)+})
]
is decreasing in y, it can be
easily seen from (7) and (8) that abrn ≤ F−1
(
p−(1+ρ′(0))c
p−c
)
. Finally, for
n = 1, . . . , N − 1, the inequality abrn ≥ abrn+1 directly follows from part (iii)
of the lemma. Thus, (ii) holds. The proof is complete. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: We prove the theorem together with the addi-
tional result (iii) H ′n(R) ≥ (1 + d)H ′n+1(R) on R ≥ cabrn by induction on n.
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we prove that (i) holds for N , (ii) holds
for N and N + 1, and (iii) holds for N . Then, by inductively assuming that
(i) and (iii) hold for n + 1 and (ii) holds for n + 1 and n + 2, we prove that
(i), (ii) and (iii) hold for n.
We first prove that (i) and (iii) hold for N and (ii) holds for N and N + 1.
By (5) and GdN+1(y) = (γ − c)y, we have adN+1 = 0. Thus, it follows that,
when R ≥ 0,
V˜N+1(x, R) = VN+1(x, R − cx) = R + (γ − c)x
= GdN+1(max{adN+1, x}) + HN+1(R).
This shows that (ii) holds for N + 1. When n = N , since V˜N+1(x, R) =
R + (γ − c)x, it follows from (6), (7), and (8) that
πN(y, R) = (γ − c)E[(y − DN)+]
+ (p − c)E[min{y, DN }] + φ(R − cy) + cy
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1 + d)R + GdN(y), 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c;
(1 + ρ′(0))R + GbrN (y)
− (ρ(cy − R) − ρ′(0)(cy − R)) , y ≥ R/c.
Note that πN(y, R) is concave in y and ρ(cy − R) − ρ′(0)(cy − R)
is increasing in y on y ≥ R/c. Then, when R ≥ cadn , y∗N(R) =
arg maxy≥0 πN(y, R) = adN . When cabrN ≤ R ≤ cadN , since πN(y, R) is
increasing in y on 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c and it is decreasing in y on y ≥ R/c, it
follows that y∗N(R) = R/c. Thus, (i) holds when n = N . In addition, when
R ≥ cx, we have
π˜N (x, R) = πN(max{y∗N(R), x}, R)
=
{
(1 + d)R + GdN(max{adn , x}), R ≥ cadn ;
πN(R/c, R), ca
br
N ≤ R ≤ cadN .
Thus, (ii) also holds when n = N . Finally, for any R ≥ cabrN , since HN(R)
is a concave function, we have H ′N(R) ≥ 1 + d = (1 + d)H ′N+1(R). Thus,
(iii) also holds for N .
Now assume inductively that (i) and (iii) hold for n + 1 and (ii) holds for
n + 1 and n + 2. In what follows, we prove that (i), (ii) and (iii) hold for n,
which then completes the proof.
First, we prove (i) holds for n. Suppose R ≥ cadn+1 and y ≤ R/c. Then,
R ≥ cabrn+1 by Lemma 2. By the inductive assumption on (ii) for n + 1, we
have
πn(y, R) = E[V˜n+1
(
(y − Dn)+, (p − c) min {y, Dn} + φ(R − cy) + cy
)]
= E[V˜n+1
(
(y − Dn)+, (p − c) min {y, Dn} + (1 + d)R − dcy
)]
= (1 + d)N−n+1R + Gdn(y). (13)
When R > cadn , since adn ≥ adn+1, it follows from (13) that πn(y, R) is
increasing in y when y ≤ adn , and it is decreasing in y when adn ≤ y ≤ R/c.
Note that πn(y, R) is concave in y when y ≥ 0. Thus, y∗n(R) = adn when
R > cadn .
Now suppose cabrn ≤ R ≤ cadn ; and we shall prove that y∗n(R) = R/c
in this case. By the definition of y∗n(R), it suffices to prove that πn(y, R) is
increasing in y when y ≤ R/c, and πn(R/c, R) = maxy≥R/c πn(y, R). In
what follows, we prove these two results sequentially.
We first prove πn(y, R) is increasing in y on y ≤ R/c. When cadn+1 ≤
R ≤ cadn , πn(y, R) is given by (13) and the desired result is clearly true.
Now suppose cabrn ≤ R ≤ cadn+1, and we prove that the desired result is also
true in this case. Since πn(y, R) is concave in y, we only need to prove that
∂πn(y,R)
∂y
|y=R/c ≥ 0.
When y ≤ R/c, by the inductive assumption on (ii) for n + 1, we have
πn(y, R) = Gdn+1(adn+1)
+ E[Hn+1 ((p − c) min {y, Dn} + (1 + d)R − dcy)]. (14)
Taking the partial derivative with respect to y and letting y = R/c, we obtain
∂πn(R/c, R)
∂y
= E [((p − c)1{R/c≤Dn} − dc)H ′n+1 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn} + R)]
= (p − (1 + d)c)F¯ (R/c)H ′n+1(pR/c)
− dcE [1{R/c≥Dn}H ′n+1 ((p − c)Dn + R)] (15)
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≥ (p − (1 + d)c)F¯ (R/c)H ′n+1(pR/c) − dcF (R/c)H ′n+1(R)
≥ ((1 + d)(p − c)F¯ (R/c)H ′n+2(pR/c) − dcH ′n+1(R))F(R/c),
where 1{A} is the indicator function; the first inequality is from the concavity
of Hn+1(·); and the second one is from the inductive assumption on (iii),
Hn+2(R) is increasing in R, and R/c ≤ adn+1 ≤ F−1
(
p−(1+d)c
p−c
)
.
By (15), to prove ∂πn(R/c,R)
∂y
≥ 0, it suffices to show that
(1 + d)(p − c)F¯ (R/c)H ′n+2(pR/c) ≥ dcH ′n+1(R). (16)
Using the inductive assumptions on (ii) for n + 1 and n + 2, we obtain
∂πn+1(R/c, R)
∂y
≤ E [((p − c)1{R/c≤Dn+1} − dc)H ′n+2 ((p − c) min{R/c, Dn+1} + R)] ,
and
H ′n+1(R) =
dπn+1(R/c, R)
dR
≤ E
[(
p − c
c
1{R/c≤Dn+1} + 1
)
H ′n+2 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn+1} + R)
]
.
Combining the above two inequalities, we obtain
∂πn+1(R/c, R)
∂y
+ cdH ′n+1(R) ≤ (1 + d)(p − c)F¯ (R/c)H ′n+2(pR/c).
Since cabrn ≤ R ≤ cadn+1 and by the inductive assumption on (i), we have
∂πn+1(R/c,R)
∂y
≥ 0. Thus, (16) holds. Therefore, when cabrn ≤ R ≤ cadn+1,
πn(y, R) is increasing in y on y ≤ R/c.
We next prove πn(R/c, R) = maxy≥R/c πn(y, R) when cabrn ≤ R ≤ cadn .
For y ≥ 0, we define
πbn (y, R) = E[V˜n+1((y − Dn)+, (p − c) min {y, Dn} + R − ρ′(0)(cy − R))].
Then, by Lemma 1, it is easy to verify that πbn (y, R) is concave in y. When
y ≥ R/c, it follows from (6) that
πn(y, R) = E[V˜n+1((y − Dn)+, (p − c) min{y, Dn} + R − ρ(cy − R))].
Since ρ(·) is a convex function, ρ(cy−R) ≥ ρ′(0)(cy−R) when y ≥ R/c.
Then, by Lemma 1 (i), it follows that πn(y, R) ≤ πbn (y, R) when y ≥ R/c
and πn(R/c, R) = πbn (R/c, R). Therefore, to prove the desired result, it
suffices to prove that πbn (y, R) is decreasing in y when y ≥ R/c − 	, with 	
being a sufficiently small positive number, or equivalently, ∂π
b
n (R/c,R)
∂y
≤ 0.
In what follows, we divide the analysis into two cases.
CASE 1: R ≥ c max{adn+1, abrn }. In this case, when y ≤ R/c, by the
inductive assumption on (ii),
πbn (y, R) = E[V˜n+1((y − Dn)+, (p − c) min {y, Dn} + R
+ ρ′(0)(R − cy))]
= (1 + d)N−n(1 + ρ′(0))R + Gbrn (y).
Since abrn = arg maxy≥0 Gbrn (y), it is obviously that ∂π
b
n (R/c,R)
∂y
≤ 0.
CASE 2: cabrn ≤ R < cadn+1. In this case, by Lemma 2, abrn =
F−1
(
p−(1+ρ′(0))c
p−c
)
. When y ≤ R/c, by the inductive assumption on (ii),
πbn (y, R) = E[V˜n+1((y − Dn)+, (p − c) min {y, Dn} + R
+ ρ′(0)(R − cy))]
= Gdn+1(adn+1) + E
[
Hn+1
(
(p − c) min{y, Dn} + R + ρ′(0)(R − cy)
)]
.
Taking the partial derivative with respect to y and letting y = R/c, we
obtain
∂πbn (R/c, R)
∂y
= E [((p − c)1{R/c≤Dn} − ρ′(0)c)H ′n+1 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn} + R)]
≤ E [(p − c)1{R/c≤Dn} − ρ′(0)c]E [H ′n+1 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn} + R)]
= ((p − c)F¯ (R/c) − ρ′(0)c)E [H ′n+1 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn} + R)]
≤ 0,
where the first inequality is from the concavity of Hn+1(·); and the last one
holds as R ≥ cabrn and Hn+1(·) is an increasing function.
Summarizing the above arguments, we have proved that (i) holds for n.
Second, we prove (ii) holds for n. When R ≥ cx, by part (i) for n and
(13),
V˜n(x, R) = πn(max{y∗n(R), x}, R)
=
{
πn(R/c, R), ca
br
n ≤ R ≤ cadn ;
(1 + d)N+1−nR + Gdn(max{adn , x}), R ≥ cadn .
Thus, (ii) holds for n.
Finally, we prove (iii) for n. When R ≥ cadn+1, since (ii) holds for n and
n + 1 and Hn(·) is a concave function, then H ′n(R) ≥ (1 + d)N−n+1 =
(1 + d)H ′n+1(R).
Now suppose cabrn ≤ R ≤ cadn+1. In this case, by (ii) for n and (14), we
obtain
H ′n(R) =
dπn(R/c, R)
dR
= ∂E[Hn+1 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn} + R)]
∂R
= E
[(
p − c
c
1{R/c≤Dn} + 1
)
H ′n+1 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn} + R)
]
;
while by the inductive assumptions on (ii) for n + 1 and n + 2, we have
H ′n+1(R) =
dπn+1(R/c, R)
dR
= ∂E[V˜n+2
(
(R/c − Dn+1)+, (p − c) min {R/c, Dn+1} + R
)]
∂R
≤ E
[(
p − c
c
1{R/c≤Dn+1} + 1
)
× H ′n+2 ((p − c) min {R/c, Dn+1} + R)
]
,
where the inequality is from that Gn+2(max{adn+2, x}) is decreasing in x.
Since Dn and Dn+1 are identically distributed, it follows from the induc-
tive assumption on (iii) that H ′n(R) ≥ (1 + d)H ′n+1(R). Thus, (iii) holds
for n. The proof is complete. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: We first prove y∗N(R) = arg maxy≥R+/c
πN (y, R) when w < R < cabrN . From the definition of y∗N(R), it suffices to
prove that πN(y, R) is increasing in y on 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c and 0 ≤ R < cabrN .
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From the proof of Theorem 2, πN(y, R) = (1 + d)R + GdN(y) when
0 ≤ y ≤ R/c. By Lemma 2, we have abrN ≤ adN , henceπN(y, R) is increasing
in y on 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c < abrN ≤ adN . Thus, the desired result holds.
Now suppose y ≥ R+/c. Since V˜N+1(x, R) = R + (γ − c)x, it follows
from (6) that
πN(y, R) = (p − c)y − (p − γ )E[(y − DN)+] − ρ(cy − R) + R.
Taking the partial derivative of πN(y, R) with respect to y, we obtain
∂πN(y, R)
∂y
= p − c (1 + ρ′(cy − R))− (p − γ )F (y).
Since πN(y, R) is concave in y, it is increasing in y when ∂πN (y,R)∂y ≥
0, or equivalently, when F(y) ≤ p−c(1+ρ′(cy−R))
p−γ . Since y
∗
N(R) =
arg maxy≥R+/c πN (y, R), we obtain
y∗N(R) = sup
{
y ≥ R+/c
∣∣∣ F(y) ≤ p − c
(
1 + ρ′(cy − R))
p − γ
}
.
Since ρ(·) is a convex function, ρ′(cy − R) is decreasing in R, and
p−c(1+ρ′(cy−R))
p−γ is increasing in R when R ≤ cy. Thus, it directly fol-
lows from the definition of y∗N(R) that it is increasing in R. The proof is
complete. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2: For convenience, denoteψ(R) as the right-
hand-side function of R in the corollary, and we need to prove y∗N(R) =
ψ(R)when −Km < R < cab1N . By Proposition 2, it suffices to prove 1) when
R+/c ≤ y < ψ(R), F(y) ≤ p−c(1+ρ′(cy−R))
p−γ ; and 2) when y > ψ(R),
F(y) >
p−c(1+ρ′(cy−R))
p−γ . In what follows, we verify them sequentially.
We first verify (1). Suppose R+/c ≤ y < ψ(R). Then, by Proposition 2,
we have
F(y) < F(ψ(R)) ≤
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
F(a
bm
N ), −Km < R < cabmN − Km;
F(a
bm
N ), ca
bm
N − Km ≤ R < cabmN − Km−1;
F(a
bm−1
N ), ca
bm
N − Km−1 ≤ R < cabm−1N − Km−1;
.
.
.
.
.
.
F(a
b1
N ), ca
b1
N − K1 ≤ R < cab1N .
In addition, since cy − R < cψ(R) − R and by the definition of ρ(z), we
have
ρ′(cy − R) ≤
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
bm, −Km < R < cabmN − Km;
bm, ca
bm
N − Km ≤ R < cabmN − Km−1;
bm−1, cabmN − Km−1 ≤ R < cabm−1N − Km−1;
.
.
.
.
.
.
b1, ca
b1
N − K1 ≤ R < cab1N .
Since F(abiN ) = p−c(1+bi )p−γ , i = 1, . . . , m, 1) follows directly from the above
two expressions.
We next verify (2). Suppose y > ψ(R). Then, by Proposition 2, we have
F(y) > F(ψ(R)) ≥
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
F(0), −Km < R < cabmN − Km;
F(a
bm
N ), ca
bm
N − Km ≤ R < cabmN − Km−1;
F(a
bm
N ), ca
bm
N − Km−1 ≤ R < cabm−1N − Km−1;
.
.
.
.
.
.
F(a
b1
N ), ca
b1
N − K1 ≤ R < cab1N .
In addition, since cy − R > cψ(R) − R and by the definition of ρ(z), we
have
ρ′(cy − R) ≥
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(p − c)/c, −Km < R < cabmN − Km;
bm, ca
bm
N − Km ≤ R < cabmN − Km−1;
bm, ca
bm
N − Km−1 ≤ R < cabm−1N − Km−1;
.
.
.
.
.
.
b1, ca
b1
N − K1 ≤ R < cab1N .
Since F(abiN ) = p−c(1+bi )p−γ , i = 1, . . . , m, (2) follows directly from the above
two expressions. The proof is complete. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: As y∗n(R) ≥ 0, the proposition is trivially
true when R ≤ 0. Thus, we only prove y∗n(R) ≥ R/c when 0 < R ≤ cabrn .
In what follows, we suppose 0 < R ≤ cabrn . When n = N , y∗N(R) is given
in (9) and the result is clearly true. Thus, to complete the proof, by the defi-
nition of y∗n(R), it remains to prove that: (1) πN−1(y, R) is increasing in y
when 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c; and (2) when d = 0, πn(y, R) is increasing in y when
0 ≤ y ≤ R/c, n = 1, . . . , N .
When 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c, by (6), we obtain
πn(y, R) = E[V˜n+1
(
(y − Dn)+, (p − c) min {y, Dn} + (1 + d)R − dcy
)].
(17)
We first prove that πN−1(y, R) is increasing in y when 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c.
When cadN ≤ R ≤ cabrN−1, by the proof of Theorem 2, for any 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c,
we have
πN−1(y, R) = (1 + d)2R + GdN−1(y).
Thus, by the definition of adN−1 and a
d
N−1 ≥ abrN−1 by Lemma 2, πN−1(y, R)
is increasing in y when 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c. In the following, we prove the desired
result when 0 < R ≤ cadN .
By Theorem 2 and (9), it is easy to verify that, when R ≥ cx, V˜N (x, R) =
GdN(max{adN , x}) + HN(R), where
HN(R) =
{
πn(y
∗
N(R), R) − GdN(adN ), 0 < R ≤ cadN ;
(1 + d)R, R ≥ cadN .
Then, by Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 (ii), HN(R) is concave in R and
H ′N(R) ≥ 1 + d. Thus, when 0 < R < cadN and y ≤ R/c, (17) can be
rewritten as
πN−1(y, R) = GdN(adN ) + E[HN ((p − c) min {y, DN−1} + (1 + d)R − dcy)].
Taking the partial derivative with respect to y and letting y = R/c, we obtain
∂πN−1(R/c, R)
∂y
= (p − (1 + d)c)F¯ (R/c)H ′N(pR/c) − dc
E
[
1{R/c≥DN−1}H
′
N ((p − c)DN−1 + R)
]
≥ (p − (1 + d)c)(1 + d)F¯ (R/c) − dcF (R/c)H ′N(R)
≥ cdF (R/c)
(
(1 + d)(p − c)
cd
F¯ (R/c) − H ′N(R)
)
≥ cdF (R/c)
(
1 + p − c
c
F¯ (R/c) − H ′N(R)
)
, (18)
where the first inequality is from the concavity of HN(·) and H ′N(R) ≥
1 + d, and the remaining two inequalities are both from R/c ≤ adN ≤
F−1
(
p−(1+d)c
p−c
)
.
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Since πN−1(y, R) is concave in y, to prove the desired result, it suffices
to show ∂πN−1(R/c,R)
∂y
≥ 0. By (18), it is sufficient to prove that, when
0 < R ≤ cadN ,
H ′N(R) ≤ 1 +
p − c
c
F¯ (R/c). (19)
Note that y∗N(R) ≥ R/c when 0 < R ≤ cadN . In what follows, we divide
the analysis into the following two cases and separately prove (19) holds in
both cases.
CASE 1: y∗N(R) = R/c. In this case, by (6), we obtain
H ′N(R) =
dπN(R/c, R)
dR
= 1 + p − c
c
F¯ (R/c) + γ − c
c
F (R/c)
≤ 1 + p − c
c
F¯ (R/c),
where the inequality follows from c ≥ γ . Hence, (19) holds when y∗N(R) =
R/c.
CASE 2: y∗N(R) > R/c. In this case, for any y > R/c, by (6), we obtain
πN(y, R) = (γ − c)E[(y − DN)+] + (p − c)
E[min{y, DN }] − ρ(cy − R) + R.
Taking the partial derivative with respect to y and letting y = y∗N(R), we
obtain
∂πN(y
∗
N(R), R)
∂y
= (γ−c)F (y∗N(R))+(p−c)F¯ (y∗N(R))−cρ′(cy∗N(R)−R).
Since y∗N(R) > R/c,
∂πN (y
∗
N
(R),R)
∂y
= 0. In addition, since γ ≤ c, it
follows that
cρ′(cy∗N(R) − R) ≤ (p − c)F¯ (y∗N(R)) ≤ (p − c)F¯ (R/c).
By the definition of H˜N (R), we have
H ′N(R) =
dπN(y∗N(R), R)
dR
= 1 + ρ′(cy∗n+1(R) − R) ≤ 1 +
p − c
c
F¯ (R/c).
Thus, (19) also holds when y∗N(R) > R/c.
Therefore, we have shown ∂πN−1(R/c,R)
∂y
≥ 0 when 0 < R ≤ cadN . The
proof for (1) is complete.
We next prove that, when d = 0, πn(y, R) is increasing in y when
0 ≤ y ≤ R/c, n = 1, . . . , N . When cadn+1 ≤ R ≤ cabrn , by the proof
of Theorem 2, for any 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c, we have
πn(y, R) = R + Gdn(y).
Thus, by the definition of adn and adn ≥ abrn by Lemma 2, πn(y, R) is
increasing in y when 0 ≤ y ≤ R/c.
In what follows, we prove by induction on n that y∗n(R) ≥ R/c when
0 < R ≤ cadn+1. From the first part of the proof, the result is obviously
true for n = N . Now assume inductively that the result is true for n + 1. To
complete the proof, we shall prove that the result is also true for n.
By Theorem 2 and the inductive assumption, it is easy to verify that, when
R ≥ cx, V˜n+1(x, R) = Gdn+1(max{adn+1, x}) + Hn+1(R), where
Hn+1(R) =
{
πn(y
∗
n+1(R), R) − Gdn+1(adn+1), 0 < R ≤ cadn+1;
R, R ≥ cadn+1.
Thus, when 0 < R ≤ cadn+1 and y ≤ R/c, (17) can be simplified as
πn(y, R) = Gdn+1(adn+1) + E[Hn+1 ((p − c) min {y, Dn} + R)].
Note that Hn+1(·) is an increasing function. Thus, πn(y, R) is increasing in
y when y ≤ R/c. Hence, y∗n(R) ≥ R/c when 0 < R ≤ cadn+1. The proof is
complete. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: Notice that abn is a special case of adn when d = b.
Thus, part (i) directly follows from Lemma 2 (i). We now prove part (ii).
First, by definition and part (i), ablN = abN = F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−γ
)
.
Second, we prove by induction on n that abln+1 > abln , n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
When n = N − 1, it follows from (10) that
ablN−1 =
cabN − (p − (1 + b)c)abN−1
(1 + b)c ≤
1
1 + b a
b
N < a
b
N = ablN .
Thus, ablN > a
bl
N−1. Now assume inductively that a
bl
n+1 > abln . By the
definition of abln in (10),
abln − abln−1 =
c(abln+1 − abln ) − (p − (1 + b)c)(abn − abn−1)
(1 + b)c .
Since abln+1 > abln by the inductive assumption and abn ≤ abn−1 from part (i),
we obtain abln > abln−1. Thus, by induction, we have shown that a
bl
n+1 > abln ,
n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Finally, we prove abl1 > − p−(1+b)cbc F−1
(
p−(1+b)c
p−c
)
. By the definition of
abl1 and a
bl
2 > a
bl
1 , we have a
bl
1 =
cabl2 −(p−(1+b)c)ab1
(1+b)c >
cabl1 −(p−(1+b)c)ab1
(1+b)c .
Then, it follows that
abl1 > −
p − (1 + b)c
bc
ab1 ≥ −
p − (1 + b)c
bc
F−1
(
p − (1 + b)c
p − c
)
,
where the second inequality is from part (i). The proof is complete. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: The proof is by induction on n. When R ≤
cablN = cabrN , it directly follows from Proposition 2 that y∗N(R) = abN .
In addition, since V˜N+1(x, R) = R + (γ − c)x, we have πN(y, R) =
(1 + b)R + GbN(y) when y ≥ R+/c. Thus, when R ≤ cablN and x ≥ 0,
V˜N (x, R) = max
y≥x πN (y, R) = πN(max{a
b
N , x}, R)
= (1 + b)R + GbN(max{abN , x}).
This proves the result for N . Now assume inductively that the theorem holds
for n + 1. In what follows, we prove that it also holds for n, which then
completes the proof.
Suppose R ≤ cabln . Then, by the definition of abln , we have R ≤
cabl
n+1−(p−(1+b)c)abn
1+b , or equivalently, a
b
n ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c . Thus, by Lemma 3,
we have R/c ≤ abln ≤ abn ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c .
When 0 ≤ y ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c , for all Dn ≥ 0, we have
(p − c) min{y, Dn} + (1 + b)R − bcy
≤ (p − (1 + b)c)y + (1 + b)R ≤ cabln+1;
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and, since abln+1 ≤ abln+2/(1 + b) from the definition of abln , we also have
(y − Dn)+ ≤ (1 + b)(p − c)
p − (1 + b)c (y − Dn)
+
+ ca
bl
n+2 − (1 + b) ((p − (1 + b)c)y + (1 + b)R)
p − (1 + b)c
= ca
bl
n+2 − (1 + b) ((p − c) min{y, Dn} + (1 + b)R − bcy)
p − (1 + b)c .
Thus, when R+/c ≤ y ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c , by the inductive assumption on (ii)
for n + 1, we have
πn(y, R) = E
[
V˜n+1((y − Dn)+, (p − c) min{y, Dn} + (1 + b)R − bcy)
]
= E[Gbn+1(max{abn+1, (y − Dn)+})]
+ (1 + b)N−n ((p − c)E[min{y, Dn}] + (1 + b)R − bcy)
= Gbn(y) + (1 + b)N−n+1R.
Since abn is the maximizer of Gbn(y), πn(y, R) is increasing in y when
R+/c ≤ y ≤ abn and it is decreasing in y when abn ≤ y ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c .
Since πn(y, R) is concave in y when y ≥ 0, we conclude that y∗n(R) = abn
when R ≤ cabln . Thus, (i) holds for n.
When R ≤ cabln and 0 ≤ x ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c , since R/c ≤ abn ≤
cabl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c , we have R
+/c ≤ max{abn , x} ≤ ca
bl
n+1−(1+b)R
p−(1+b)c . Then, by
applying the above expression for πn(y, R), we obtain
V˜n(x, R) = max
y≥x πn(y, R) = πn(max{a
b
n , x}, R)
= Gbn(max{abn , x}) + (1 + b)N−n+1R.
This shows that (ii) holds for n. Thus, the result has been shown to hold for
an arbitrary n, and the proof is complete. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 4: The proofs for the results in Theorem 4 are
similar to those for the corresponding results in Theorems 2 and 3. Hence,
they are omitted here for brevity. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: When w + cx ≥ cabrN or w + cx ≤ w,
from Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollary 1, we know that it is optimal for the
firm not to borrow in period N when K = 0. In this case, it is clear that
it is optimal for the firm not to borrow either when K > 0. Consequently,
when w + cx ≥ cabrN or w + cx ≤ w, from Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollary
1 one can easily verify that the firm’s optimal policy is correctly given in
Proposition 4.
Now we suppose w < w + cx < cabrN . In this case, we know from Propo-
sition 2 that it is optimal for the firm to borrow some capital and raise its
inventory up to the level y∗N(w+cx) if K = 0. Note that the firm’s objective
function is concave in y when K = 0. Then, for the region when the firm
does not borrow, it is optimal for the firm to use up its own capital w+ to
purchase inventory. On the other hand, for the region when the firm borrows,
since the fixed cost K becomes a sunk cost, it is optimal for the firm to raise
its inventory up to level y∗N(w + cx). Consequently, the firm’s optimal deci-
sion is the one of the above two decisions that gives higher expected terminal
wealth.
Finally, when ρ(z) = bz with d ≤ b < (p − c)/c, we have w = −∞
and y∗N(w + cx) = abN when w + cx ≤ cabrN . In addition, when w ≥ 0, it
is easy to verify that the expected terminal wealth when the firm uses up its
capital w to purchase inventory is GbN(w/c+x)+ (1+b)(w+cx); whereas
the expected terminal wealth when the firm orders its inventory up to abN is
GbN(a
b
N ) + (1 + b)(w + cx) − K . Note that GbN(y) is a concave function
and achieves maximization when y = abN . Thus,
GbN(w/c + x) + (1 + b)(w + cx) − (GbN (abN ) + (1 + b)(w + cx) − K)
= GbN(w/c + x) − GbN(abN ) + K
is increasing in w + cx and it is positive when w + cx = abN . Therefore,
there exists a critical point r∗ (which can be −∞) such that it is optimal to
order up to abN when w + cx ≤ r∗ and to use up the firm’s capital w when
r∗ < w + cx < cabN . The proof is complete. 
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